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WHY WE SHOULD KEEP FLORIDA'S ELECTED CABINET
MALCOLM B. JOHNSON
In more than four decades of reporting and analyzing the news of
Florida government, there have been at least three rather extended
periods when, if there had been a choice between retaining the
elected state Cabinet or an elected Governor, I would have abolished
the governorship. I suspect I would have had the support of a sub-
stantial segment of the citizenry.
It is possible for Floridians to select a poor Governor but, with the
constitutional cabinet system, it is difficult to have a bad adminis-
tration. For the independently elected Cabinet officers, responsible
separately to the electorate, tend to buck up and block capricious,
mischievous, or autocratic abuses by the Governor and his ap-
pointed administrators.
It is this safeguard against gubernatorial absolutism that the peo-
ple of Florida are being asked to surrender by abolishing the cabinet
system through adoption of Revision No. 4 in the revised constitu-
tion which is subject to referendum in the November general elec-
tion. That revision should be rejected.
A distinction between the "Cabinet" and the "cabinet system" as
we know it in Florida should be noted. A bit of historical background.
may help the perspective.
If the present system is scrapped, we still will have what amounts
to a "Cabinet" of variable authority. Mere orderly administration
of the multiple affairs of government will dictate such an organiza-
tion. But members of that Cabinet, by whatever name, will be ap-
pointed by, responsible to, and subject to ouster by the Governor.
They may meet with him and advise him if he wants them to. He
could consult them singly, and privately, if he preferred, and su-
persede their judgments by dictated orders without information or
explanation to the public. He cannot do that now with indepen-
dently elected Cabinet officers.
Historically, Floridians have elected their secretary of state, at-
torney general, comptroller, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture,
and commissioner of education. For decades, each has had assigned
duties generally defined by their titles. Gradually, over the years,
new powers of supervision and regulation were conferred by the
legislature or by constitutional amendment on boards made up of
all or some members of this constitutional group. For convenience
of the members, and of parties who had business with the state, it
became traditional for all these boards to meet in a sequence of open
sessions every Tuesday in Tallahassee. With a coming and going of
the various board staffs and action on their agendas, they could at
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a sitting dispose of a wide range of often overlapping governmental
affairs assigned to them by law. The Cabinet has operated like a
corporation's board of directors, with the Governor presiding but
exercising his authority by only one vote and (except in cases of
clemency for convicted criminals) no veto.
At the same time, the Governor has exercised exclusive supervi-
sion over a broad and growing range of public business outside the
authority of Cabinet boards. Also, individual Cabinet officers hold
sole power in certain designated phases of government.
The term "Cabinet" was conferred only by public usage until the
1968 constitution adopted it as a formal title. Although the Cabinet
thus nominally was given constitutional dignity for the first time ten
years ago, other provisions of the 1968 constitution planted the seeds
for deterioration of the "cabinet system." Foremost among these
was a decree that all executive government should be pigeon-holed
by the legislature into no more than twenty-five separate depart-
ments. This impelled the 1969 legislature, feeling the oats of a court-
ordered reapportionment's overturning old lines of political power,
to shuffle around the administrative powers of many boards pre-
viously made up by statutory law of the elected "cabinet officers."
By a peculiar alliance of zealous Democratic reformers in the
legislature and a new Republican Governor who felt frustrated by
having to share decisions with six independently elected Democratic
Cabinet members, the twenty-five-department reorganization
shifted considerable power from the "Cabinet boards" to the sole
prerogative of the Governor or to departments to which the Gover-
nor appoints managing directors or secretaries. Foremost among
these is the budgeting and spending power, which used to be as-
signed to the whole Cabinet sitting as a Budget Commission but
now is almost the sole responsibility of the Governor with the help
of a Department of Administration headed by his appointee. Also,
administration of all penal, correctional, and custodial institutions
was taken from the Cabinet Board of Commissioners of State Insti-
tutions and wrapped with health and welfare in a huge department
headed by an appointee of the Governor, the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services. (It is noteworthy that this combination
has been so unwieldy that each legislature since its establishment
has shuffled its elements seeking a more workable plan.)
We still have "Cabinet boards," though not as many nor as influ-
ential as before 1969. These boards sit with the Governor in making
decisions on management of state lands and property, environmen-
tal problems, investment of multimillions of trust funds, manage-
ment of state and county debts, and many less glamorous but im-
portant duties. The last two Governors, like many before them,
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have found the sharing of such decisions irksome and found some
obstructions to their programs by Cabinet colleagues frustrating.
They have cut the regular sessions down to every other week and
leave much of the decision groundwork to preliminary meetings of
"Cabinet aides." With this recent history of deterioration, it is
proper to ask whether the "cabinet system" any longer is worth
saving. I think it is.
As long as we have independently elected Cabinet officers, future
legislatures (like some in the past) will be able to reassign to boards
composed of them some controversial major functions when or if a
Governor begins to abuse his executive powers through incompe-
tence or chicanery.
Moreover, the Cabinet as it operates today retains powers over
clemency for criminals, investment of trust funds, the purchase,
sale, and management of state property, and supervision of person-
nel which it would be risky to turn over to one man and a corps of
officials appointed by and responsible to him.
One example: At present the Governor may free a convicted crim-
inal only with consent of a majority of the Cabinet. If Revision No.
4 is adopted, future Governors may grant or deny clemency without
advice or restraint from anybody-grant a pardon to obtain the vote
of a legislator-lawyer whose client is in prison, or to repay a political
favor, or to pocket a gratuity. True, the revision would retain a
nominally independent parole commission. But its power to parole
would be superseded by the Governor's power to grant the same
clemency under the name of a "conditional pardon." The commis-
sion might be allowed to operate freely in ordinary cases, but it
could become only advisory or less when extra influences were ex-
erted on a Governor with power to act on his own. He could release
convicts to the supervision of officers already transferred from the
parole commission to a department directly responsible to the Gov-
ernor, or to no supervision at all. Revision No. 4 thus is the route to
total manipulation of criminal clemency by some future Governor
who finds it politically expedient, appealing to his sympathy, or
responsive to his desire for a direct payoff. It is too much power to
confer on one person or clique.
You may say the same for taking management of state trust
funds, bond borrowing, and public debt away from a board of inde-
pendently elected officers and giving it to the Governor. The revisers
acknowledge this danger by providing that such decisions shall be
made by the Governor, "acting jointly with at least one officer as
may be provided by law." In other words, it would be possible for
him to use only the rubber stamp of one other person who could have
been appointed by the Governor himself. There is too much risk
therein of temptation to collusion and all manner of corrupt or
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injudicious exercise of financial management.
Advocates of abolishing the cabinet system argue that there are
adequate safeguards in requirements that a Governor's appointees
to replace elected Cabinet officers must be confirmed by the state
senate. The federal system is given as an example. But experience
with "advice and consent" in Washington and in other states pro-
vides little reassurance. We know how often a President or a Gover-
nor recently elected is given the presumption of a "popular man-
date" which allows his appointees to slide through the confirmation
process-especially where his political party dominates the legisla-
ture, which usually is the case in Florida.
Furthermore, even if the senate properly challenges the Gover-
nor's choice, this sets up a delayed series of hearings and unsettled
administrative responsibility for a period during which control pas-
ses to an entrenched bureaucracy until the one-man administration
sits sufficiently secure in the driver's seat to crack the whip. With
expanding unionization of that bureaucracy (and labor contracts
ultimately up to a Governor who may have been elected with union
support), it will be hard to avoid bureaucratic control for the whole
term, much less a chaotic period at the beginning of each new ad-
ministration when a Governor is trying to implant his own manage-
ment and policies. Retaining the independently elected Cabinet
would at least assure some continuity and coherence in the change
of administrations.
Supporters of Cabinet abolition answer fears of one-man rule by
saying a Governor in total charge is under sufficient restraints from
the legislature and by his responsibility to the electorate. They
imagine a barrier to abuse through the ideal exercise of publicly
"pinpointing responsibility on one man." But what good is that
pinpointing, what restraint against arbitrary and arrogant action
is there, when a Governor and his appointees have been once re-
elected and are running out the two-term limit under temptations
to free-wheel and deal to accomplish their purposes with good or
evil intentions before their authority expires?
As for legislative restraint, those of us who have watched the scene
very long know there is a deliberately inherent contest in our system
which from time to time allows a particularly strong Governor to
control by trading for legislative votes, or an especially weak Gover-
nor to be pushed around by more aggressive legislators. It has hap-
pened, both ways, in recent Florida history. In each case it would
have been worse if we had not had six independently elected Cabi-
net officers to stand as buffers between Governor and legisla-
ture-almost always to buttress the executive. We need to keep that
buffer handy.
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The only other defense against an irresponsible or malicious Gov-
ernor is impeachment-and, as Thomas Jefferson asserted, im-
peachment is scarcely a scarecrow against a tyrannical or incompe-
tent official. No Florida official ever has been removed by legislative "
impeachment, though a handful have resigned rather than face it.*
Critics of the cabinet system make much of derelictions in recent
years which brought ouster of three elected Cabinet officers. It must
be remembered, though, that every one of their alleged defalcations
resulted entirely from exercise of individual ministerial powers-
none from actions around the open table of Cabinet boards. The
preventive for such abuses should be to take those separate, exclu-
sive powers away from individuals and put them under the whole
board or officers subject to it-take one-man insurance regulations
away from the treasurer, for example, and put banking beyond the
comptroller's exclusive power. The legislature can do this under
either the present constitution or the proposed one. Can we expect
fewer abuses from a comptroller, treasurer, or other Cabinet officer
answerable only to a Governor who may be the crony who appointed
him than we have from one answerable to the electorate and the
impeachment process? That is what we are asked to do.
There is validity to an objection that Cabinet officers now can
build separate, autocratic empires by unlimited tenure while serv-
ing under Governors who are allowed to succeed themselves only
once. They can thereby become too powerful and develop proprie-
tary attitudes toward their public offices. However, the Constitution
Revision Commission admirably meets this objection with a clause
in the general provision article (No. 1 on the November ballot)
which would limit future Cabinet officers to two successive four-
year terms if they are retained. Also, Revision No. 1 contains meth-
ods, now lacking, for suspending Cabinet officers during pendency
of felony charges against them. Thus, a vote to retain the elective
Cabinet by rejecting Revision No. 4, while limiting tenure and ex-
panding ouster methods by ratification of No. 1, should go a long
way toward repairing flaws in the present system.
* For a different view of the effectiveness of impeachment as a remedy in Florida, see Karl
& Davis, Impeachment in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1978).-Ed.
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